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Abstract
This paper argues that a resilience and adaptability in face of climate change is largely dependent
upon the ways in which framing occurs and knowledge is produced and diffused in particular
communities and contexts. Climate change problems are contextual, multifaceted and complex,
engendering wide variation in social sense making and invoking different formulations of facts
and relevant knowledge. Transferring and translating information among different ways of
knowing and transforming ways of knowing so that they are more inclusive and accepted is
critical to adaptability and resilience. Examples from the American West and Latin America
illustrate that only when multiple frames and ways of knowing are incorporated and transformed
can policy respond to climate risks related to water resources.

Introduction
Multiple, overlapping and often conflicting framing and ways of knowing the issue of climate
change are the major impediment to understanding climate risk and vulnerability and making
science more relevant to decision making. The development of physical climate models, where
science has expended most of its attention to producing knowledge, indicate that magnitude of
effects of change vary depending on factors including, among many others, geography, regional
meteorology, and ecology. Similar variation in the magnitude of impacts occurs in social,
political and economic risk and vulnerabilities to climate change, but this knowledge is neither as
well produced nor as widely utilized in decision making. People’s vulnerabilities vary with their
position within social and political geography/space. Accumulated consequences of poverty,
poor health, dislocation, lack of education and the like exacerbate vulnerabilities. Even less well
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understood and more important for this paper, there are important variations in the way different
people in the same or dissimilar contexts perceive issues and assess and act on risks. In assessing
climate related risks, people draw upon such sources as identity, culture, social interactions,
place-based practical experience, moral reasoning, intuition, and myth that lead them to adopt
different frames and ways of knowing.
This paper will first consider the evolving ideas of physical and social vulnerability. The
argument will then move to a consideration of framing and the existence of multiple and
dynamic frames within a problem space (Dewulf et al, 2009). Frames invoke knowledge and
privilege some facts, ideas and relationships over others. Multiple frames are accompanied by
multiple ways of knowing. For climate change science information about risk and vulnerabilities
to modify or transform existing frames and ways of knowing, collaborative interaction must take
place. Communications about risks and vulnerability of climate change need to engage recursive
and interactional relationships employing boundary spanning tools such as boundary
organizations, objects and experiences.

Evolving Concepts of Vulnerability and Risk
Up until the last decade, science related to risk and vulnerability to climate change usually
engaged only one or a few ways of knowing dominated by experts that had comparable framing
and engaged similar epistemologies. Scientists calculated risk on the basis of probabilities of
certain physical events or phenomena taking place and communicated through ratios, scenarios,
forecasts and reports. These kinds of risk assessments overlooked the inseparability and linkages
of physical and social sides of risk and vulnerability (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Rolfe, 2008).
Susceptibility to risk is only partly a function of characteristics of physical exposures (frequency,
magnitude, duration, extent and the like). Equally important are characteristics of the community
or sector such as resources, physical and social capital, and coping mechanisms (Rolfe, 2008).
Vulnerability to climate change is affected by politics and culture. Mike Hulme (2008)
argues that contemporary discourse about climate change and climate science can not be
separated from broader cultural settings including images of catastrophe, apocalypse and fear of
the future. Climate change risks and vulnerabilities do not so much happen to societies, but
instead are constructed and used to serve different purposes, values and meanings. How sectors
and communities respond to the risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change depends
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upon such concerns as how climate is exploited to commodify the atmosphere, inspire global
social movements, or advance different ways of knowing (Hulme, 2008).
A large gap is frequently observed between expert assessment of risks and public
perceptions of risk and vulnerability. Ordinary people do not perceive risks as do scientists.
Social studies of science scholars like Brian Wynne (1996) cite cases in which failure to
incorporate local knowledge in deference to that of experts has led to mistaken policies
inappropriate to particular contexts. Thatcher (2007) argues that experts systematically disvalue
things because they do not share the experiences of ordinary people. Thatcher argues that
ordinary people do not make “errors” of judgment when confronted with weighing benefits and
costs and probabilities, but instead factor in different values that have an emotional component.
Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) similarly argue that expert conducted cost-benefit analyses
differ significantly from moral, cultural, and emotional bases people use for assigning values to
human life, health, nature and the future.
The mechanism whereby scholarly and scientific knowledge about risk can be engaged in
decision making on complex problems being variously framed and engaging many ways of
knowing is being critically reexamined. Recent research indicates that effective risk assessment
must occur through a process and practice of engaging potential users who may have differing
views (NRC 1989, 2007). Putting out prepackaged information is a kind of ‘loading dock’ model
of providing support for policy that does not work (Cash et al, 2006). Communication means
collaboration and involves effective multiparty, iterative, recursive discourse and focuses upon
human relationships and networking. Characterization of risk is constantly evolving and shifting
as different information users/generators learn from and adapt to one another (Feldman and
Ingram, under review; US Climate Change Science Program, 2008).

Multiple Frames and Ways of Knowing Climate Change
Framing is a social sense-making device that creates meaning by selecting certain issue elements
and arranging them in a meaningful way. For instance, “nature” is framed in a number of
different ways that are partially conflicting and in flux, including nature as a pristine Garden of
Eden, as uncertain and risky, and as avenging angel for past sins (Cronon, 1996). Multiple
frames on an issue like climate change creates great ambiguity as information critical to one
framing is irrelevant to another. Framing of climate change risk as a problem that can be
3

overcome by physical infrastructure and social preparation foregrounds knowledge from
engineering and planning disciplines. Framing climate change as an equity problem of burden
sharing between the developed world that has profited from greenhouse gas production and poor
countries that have produced few problems but experience the most negative consequences
invokes normative philosophy and historical and political analysis of the consequences of
colonialism and imbalances of power among nations.
Ways of knowing are linked to frames and provide the underlying logic or rationale
(Dewulf et al, 2009). Ways of knowing are a relatively new concept in inclusive management
and policy analysis (Feldman et al, 2006; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Weber and Khadamian,
2008; Ingram and Lejano, forthcoming; Schneider and Ingram, 2007). A way of knowing is an
assemblage of heterogeneous elements that relate to a particular framing or understanding of a
specific situation, problem or policy. Ways of knowing are created through communication,
discourse, and relationships. Ways of knowing an issue, policy or problem are most often
multiple even for a single individual. Rational self interest is only one way of knowing about a
problem, and this way of knowing may or may not be relevant in particular issue situations.
People have a large repertoire of cognitive and emotional tools beyond self interested rationality
such as authority, intuition, moral reasoning, direct experience, logic, belief or faith, mysticism,
etc. that contribute to their capacity for comprehending a problem situation in multiple ways,
rather than just as one stable, established way. Any one of these perceptual lenses may become
more or less relevant through reframing, continuous discourse, and engagement and learning.
Knowing is a social process, and it is formed and molded by interacting with others in specific,
grounded, situations.
Carlisle (2004) is helpful in understanding how some differences between ways of
knowing can be understood and overcome by working with the commonalities, those things that
are shared and familiar, and recognizing and transforming the differences among things that are
unfamiliar and not shared. Figure 1, adapted from Carlisle, portrays three levels of differences
among different ways of knowing as well as the boundary spanning kinds of communicative
relationships that must be engaged to overcome impediments and to foster collaboration.
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At the lowest level of potential collaboration only one way or a few very similar ways of
knowing are involved and most elements are shared between different adherents, perhaps
organizations like electric or water utilities that have much in common. Policy approaches and
strategies in this situation often move information in one direction from the better resourced,
more advanced, technologically sophisticated, more popular entities to other groups with lesser
developed capacities but the same basic perspectives. The barriers to information transfer are
fairly low. This level of boundary spanning is best characterized as training or capacity building.
The second level of collaboration among several closely related and overlapping ways of
knowing is translation. In this case related ways of knowing must incorporate new elements as a
common language, or shared meaning. Different ways of knowing contribute to the creation of
common terminology and definitions that are essential to exchange. Knowledge transfer may be
facilitated by mechanisms to encourage working teams that cross different ways of knowing, colocation of participants in the same geographical areas, the creation of a jointly produced project
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(boundary object) that engages two or more parties, and legitimizing the position of brokers or
translators (Carlisle, 2004).
The third level of collaboration, or transformation, involves bridging unrelated ways of
knowing and requires innovation in new framing and ways of knowing, adding innovative
perspectives, and elements not previously present. Boundaries become more inclusive and all
ways of knowing undergo alteration as new ways are jointly created. This level of collaboration
is most challenging, and most relevant to complex climate change governance. Collaboration at
the third level of transformation presupposes that the conditions of the other two levels have
already been satisfied. That is, different ways of knowing have already shared skill-based know
how and have a common vocabulary. The third level involves the development of more inclusive
conceptions of issues and problems and more complex and multifaceted logics of social and
physical interactions. Risk and vulnerability related to climate change, for an instance,
encompasses multiple physical and social systems at different scales and numerous underlying
logics. Ways of knowing climate change problems diverge in terms of the kinds of physical
manifestations fore-grounded such as energy, air, water, agriculture, and the like. There are also
differences in the values stressed that range from economic efficiency to equity to the survival of
particular ecosystems and species.
Different collaborative policy tools can create networks across boundaries depending
upon the number of ways of knowing that are relevant, the degree of overlap among ways of
knowing, and whether the collaborative challenge is simple information transfer or requires more
demanding translation or transformation. Scholars identifying policy strategies and tools for
collaboration have reached virtual consensus on two points (Dryzek, 1990; Hajer and Wagenaar,
2003; Innes and Booher, 2003). One is that people from a variety of points of view must be
brought together to engage in discussions that lead to more tractable problem definitions and
policy solutions. How this occurs, whether through focus groups, boundary organizations,
citizens’ conferences or other means, matters less than the opportunity for learning. A second
point of agreement is that this type of face-to-face engagement has the potential for bringing
about trust, shared experiences, empathic understanding, positive relationships, and other
community oriented consequences that will enable people to work toward new ways of knowing
that are more amenable to collective solutions (Innes and Booher, 2003; Ostrom, 1990).
Boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) provide an artifact such as a model, scenario,
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template, prototype, compact and the like that draws upon necessary but different ways of
knowing and enhances mutual understanding among different ways of knowing. Boundary
organizations, like advisory committees or task forces drawing upon science and lay members,
may perform similar services across organizational boundaries (Jasanoff, 1990; Guston, 2001).
Shared or boundary experiences, where not only do people experience the same thing but also
talk about it, also facilitate collaborative action (Feldman et al, 2006).

Water Management, Risk and Vulnerability
Water resources are an especially appropriate sector in which to examine how resilience
in face of increasing climate change related risk can come about. Water supplies have always
varied according to changing weather patterns, and climate change promises to exacerbate this
variability and increase the frequency of extreme events. Water managers have developed their
own mechanisms for hedging against such things as droughts and floods through physical
structures like dams and storage reservoirs and various strategies of demand management and
emergency planning. There is hardly a consensus about water management, and water has been
identified as being highly contentious (Conca, 2006). Expert water management is regularly
contested by environmentalists, developers and human rights advocates each focusing on
different aspects of multifaceted water and relying on divergent knowledge drawn from
disciplines like ecology, economics, politics, anthropology, history, and normative philosophy
(Blatter and Ingram, 2001; Whiteley et al, 2008). Examining some cases where climate related
water risks are high and multiple frames and ways of knowing present governance challenges is
instructive.
Urban Water Rate Increases. Water professionals have long argued that water rates, especially
in urban areas, are too low almost everywhere. The true costs of providing urban water service
are rising rapidly. Increasing price to reflect these rising costs can be a signal of both the growing
risks of scarcity of the resource, and the increasing costs of water quality and flood protection.
Logically, water rate increases in face of an uncertain water future would seem to be part of
urban water governance. Yet problems encountered in raising water rates in the cities of Tucson,
Arizona and Cochabamba, Bolivia explain why relatively low water rates persist. In both cases,
rate increases attached to framing and ways of knowing that were too narrow and ignored other
widely resonating frames. While temporarily transferred into policy, the necessary translation
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and transformation needed for sustained implementation did not occur. Instead of bringing
people together, rate increases widened differences.
Tucson Arizona is especially vulnerable to climate related drought. Urban water supply
depends upon groundwater aquifers that are being rapidly depleted and flow diverted from the
over allocated and unreliable Colorado River. The legacy of extreme political backlash from an
attempt in the 1970s to increase water rates continues to inhibit the aggressive use of higher rates
to signal increasing water risk (Martin et al, 1984). A cadre of environmentalists elected to the
city council framed the city’s increasing water problems as part of the cost of excessive growth
and insensitivity to the natural aridity in a desert city. In this frame, water was viewed as a
sensitive and vulnerable element in nature. Excessive outdoor watering reflected in great
differences between customers’ summer and winter water use were subjected to punitive rate
increases sometimes double or triple previous water bills. Further, new houses associated with
urban sprawl that spread to the foothills of the Catalina Mountains were subjected to increased
water connection fees and a lift charge associated with increased cost of pumping water to higher
elevations. A public outcry ensued that led to the recall and replacement of environmentalists on
the city council and a roll-back of water rates.
Opposition political forces drew upon powerful opposing frames. Water and economic
development have long been associated in the Southwest, and public utilities are expected to
insure access to plentiful water supplies. Los Angeles set the example of an economic miracle
when imperialistic city fathers laid claim to not only the resources of rural neighbors like the
Owens Valley but also to a lion’s share of the Colorado River. In their zeal to pursue their own
vision of environmental stewardship, Tucson city council members failed to reach out with
arguments and policies that might have been attractive to the economic development frame.
Such an argument might have portrayed more economically rational water pricing as part of
economic security, assuring both water and financial resources into the future. In the end,
replacement council members were forced to make modest water rate increases for just such
security reasons. Tucson public and utility officials have since avoided any connection between
risk and vulnerability of water supplies and growth management.
Environmentalist oriented city officials also failed to recognize the appealing frame that
related water to human rights and fairness. Affordable water is widely regarded in the American
West and elsewhere is practically a birthright. While it might have been possible to brand
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residents with huge lawns and swimming pools as water hogs, the steep rate increases faced by
middle and lower income water users were perceived as unfair. It was clearly insensitive to
initiate rate increases in June when big increases in water use always accompany highly elevated
desert heat. After the recall election that replaced offending city officials, the water utility has
slavishly adhered to small, incremental rate increases. Water rates are justified only on the basis
of cost of service, not as a stimulus to conservation. Further, utility managers have learned that
too much water conservation without base rate increases depletes their coffers and leaves them
with inadequate resources.
In Cochabamba, Bolivia, steep water rate increases were an element in a broader
neoliberal framing that looked to private enterprise and economic principles like full cost
recovery pricing to reform the poorly performing water sector (Schouten and Schwartz, 2006;
Baer, 2008). Coverage of urban water service reached only 57 percent meaning that 43 percent
had to rely on other sources such as community service providers, private wells and private
vendors. Matters were made worse by water scarcity caused by drought and excessive water use.
Even those with service experienced frequent outages. To cover the cost of system upgrades, the
private concession contracted by the government to run the utility for 40 years required all water
users to switch to their company for service and sharply increased rates even though this increase
was not accompanied by an improvement in service. Resistance to neoliberal policies was
already on the upsurge, and water rates increases turned out to be the tinderbox that ignited
widespread and ultimately successful protests. Opposition depended on framing of human rights
and equity, and branded as unjust not only rate increases but also the process by which contracts
were let and decisions were made (Baer, 2008). No public participation had occurred during
very hurried procedures that did not engage dislocated and angry community systems and
vendors. While ultimately the private contract was cancelled, no substantive improvement has
resulted in water service. Professional water providers have lost all confidence and legitimacy in
the eyes of water users, and there is neither the expertise nor the agreement among the dominant
ways of knowing water as a human rights and equity issue to actually administer the water utility
effectively. Unless water rate increases can become integral to framing and ways of knowing
beyond the narrow environmental, privatization and market perspectives, they cannot be
successfully adopted.
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Transboundary, Collaborative Water Management. The Bear River Basin in the Rocky
Mountain region of the United States is characterized by a highly variable, snow-driven montane
ecosystem subject to recurring drought. Climate change science predicts this region will become
increasingly vulnerable to hydrologic variability and overall scarcity of water supplies in the
future. Looking at the history of how people have adapted to the region’s variable climate and
hydrology offers important insights for understanding how boundaries among multiple frames
and ways of knowing can be bridged and transformed.
Drought adaptations in the Bear River Basin can best be “characterized as a historically
contextualized process where ways of knowing the particular interdependencies of human
hydrology in a place are brought to bear on solving problems of water scarcity” (Endter-Wada et
al, under review). Over time, people in the Bear River Basin have come to better understand the
dual physical risks of droughts and floods posed by the region’s hydrologic variability and their
own management of its rivers, lakes, and reservoirs. Equally important, they have come to know
various risks associated with their interdependent use of water and ways in which their own
decisions and choices exacerbate or ease vulnerabilities at particular times, in particular
locations, and under particular circumstances. New ways of knowing the intersections between
physical and social risks and vulnerabilities emerged through a long, historical process of human
interaction and discourse whereby people sought to understand the basin’s particular hydrologic
complexities, struggled to make sense of their own changing political-economic circumstances,
learned the meanings of specific impacts, and negotiated agreements and adjusted practices in
light of these evolving understandings.
Since European settlement, various boundary-spanning processes of information sharing
have been used in the Bear River Basin to deal with human-hydrologic risks. Settlers were united
in their framing of water as the key to survival, and its beneficial use as a practical way to fulfill
the nation’s vision of manifest destiny and the Latter-Day Saints’ goal of creating Zion and
making the desert bloom. In that context, risks and vulnerabilities mainly related to potential
conflicts in times of scarcity between different beneficial uses that diverted water. Information
sharing was aimed at recording and publicizing people’s claims and rights to water in order to
protect them and to notify others as to the legal security of their own access to water.
Over four decades after Europeans created permanent Bear River Basin communities, the
states of Idaho, Wyoming and Utah were established. Each of these framed water as essential to
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development, made water the property of its public and adopted prior appropriation water laws.
While these states agreed on ways of knowing water, information transfers became more
complicated as each state independently allocated the shared waters of the Bear River to private
use within their borders and the need for coordination increased. Beneficial uses of water
become more diversified over time as the regional economy matured, requiring translation
between different ways of knowing how to meet and coordinate the needs of different types of
users, such as agricultural diversions and in stream flows for hydropower production.
A severe drought in the 1930s served as a boundary experience leading people in the
Bear River Basin to engage in a long period of negotiations and struggles to establish an
interstate water compact. Promoting beneficial use of water for economic development was still
the overriding frame, but diversity emerged related to people’s geographic locations on the river
and the varying effects of proposals for developing storage and integrating management of the
river. The common development frame was informed by the different publics within the borders
of the three states and included needs outside the Bear River Basin’s boundaries. Interactions
and discourse over forming a compact had to span differences related to administering priorities
across state lines, integrating principles of equitable apportionment between states with existing
private rights to use water, providing for natural flow and storage rights, and balancing various
site-specific concerns. Negotiations finally resulted in a boundary object, the Bear River
Compact of 1958, and a boundary-spanning organization, the Bear River Commission. These
two tools were transformative, instituting a new way of knowing the Bear River through
interstate coordination and comity. These tools facilitated information transfers and translation
processes, brought interests back into closely aligned ways of knowing the river, and become an
accepted and embedded part of the river’s administrative context.
The regional political-economy of the Bear River Basin has continued to change. New
frames informed by amenity, aesthetic, recreational and ecosystem perspectives contend with the
still relevant economic development frame. Water management increasingly involves working
across the boundaries of multiple governmental agencies and numerous stakeholder groups.
Challenges include managing the river’s highly variable resource in a predictable manner for
people who are linked to and understand it in very different ways, and having this management
occur in separate but loosely connected forums for discussion, debate and decision-making.
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In 2004, the Bear River Basin experienced the worst drought year since the 1930s.
Despite fears about conflict, the season resulted in an extraordinary level of cooperation. Three
connected boundary objects and experiences were responsible for this particular outcome. First,
in response to a drought in the early 1990s, a precedent-setting voluntary settlement agreement
was reached in 1995 (and restated in 2004). It provided for a scaled reduction in irrigation and
hydropower deliveries tied to declining levels of Bear Lake. This agreement bridged very
different ways of knowing held by lake recreational property owners and downstream irrigation
and hydroelectric power users dependent on storage water from the lake. Second, in the period
between the drought of the early 1990s and 2004, much technical work was done in
instrumentation and hydrological modeling of the river which provided basin-specific, real-time
flow-accounting information on water deliveries and diversions. Use of this information
alleviated suspicions and conflict through creating transparency, accountability, and better
delivery coordination and efficiency. Third, open conference calls hosted by the power company
twice a week throughout the irrigation season allowed for extraordinary communication and
coordination of water delivery schedules between anyone who chose to join the calls. Embedded
in a history of ongoing dialogue, the informational and relational working and reworking paid off
in reducing conflict that often emerges in drought situations.

Conclusion
Policy response to climate risk must be informed by science, but science needs to change to
become more inclusive and engaged. It is not sufficient for climate science to simply add
consideration of social aspects to the physical vulnerabilities that have been primary concerns.
Science must also focus on risks not revealed through rational reasoning. Perceptions of climate
risks spring from identity, culture, moral reasoning, intuition, social interaction and other
sources. Vulnerability to climate change is not so much shaped by objective assessments of the
likelihood of physical and social exposure that have been the focus of science. Rather, how
climate issues are framed and what are regarded as facts and knowledge determine what public
and policy attention the issues get. Framing and ways of knowing are social sense-making
devices through which people filter what is salient and important, and identify what facts and
knowledge are relevant. As such, they are legitimate subjects of climate science.
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As the cases from the water sector cited in this paper illustrate, narrow framing relying on
only one way of knowing often defeats what could be appropriate policy for scarcity. In contrast,
boundary work that engages in recursive and interactive communication across differences and
encourages transformations toward more inclusive understanding is more helpful. Climate
scientists must be active participants in such work.
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